Shareholder Litigation and the Information Content of Management Voluntary Disclosure
研究股东诉讼如何影响管理层自愿披露的信息精度，发现法律责任的加重并不总能提高披露精度，且好消息与坏消息的精度在不同法律责任水平下存在差异。
ABSTRACT I study the information content of management voluntary disclosures disciplined by shareholder litigation. I model the litigation mechanism in which legal liabilities are based on the damages that shareholders suffer from buying a stock at an inflated price. I find that management does not fully reveal private information in equilibrium. Instead, their disclosures reveal only a range in which their private information lies. Thus, the precision of information is, to some extent, lost. Notably, increasing the severity of legal liability does not always reduce the loss of precision. In fact, when the legal liability reaches a certain level, more severe legal liability will result in less precise disclosures. I also find that good news and bad news have different precision. Specifically, good news is more precise than is bad news when legal liabilities are high, and bad news is more precise than is good news when legal liabilities are low.