Auction Platform Design and the Linkage Principle
研究了垄断拍卖平台如何通过选择拍卖形式（如第一价格或第二价格拍卖）和调整参与费来最大化利润，发现当卖家质量信息与买家信号相关时，第一价格或降价拍卖能收取更高参与费。
This paper examines an auction platform in which the monopoly platform maximizes profits by adjusting participation fees and choosing an auction format. The seller has private information on the quality of the good, and each participating buyer receives a private signal about his valuation of the good. The choice of auction format determines the allocation of trading surplus between the seller and buyers. This paper shows that when the seller's type is affiliated with the buyers' signals, the platform can charge higher participation fees on both sides by choosing a first‐price or descending auction than a second‐price or ascending auction.