Asymmetric Information about Collateral Values
研究了在抵押贷款市场中，垂直整合的贷款机构因掌握房屋建筑质量的优越信息，能选择更高品质的抵押品，从而减少高达40%的止赎率，而非整合机构则通过提高利率来应对逆向选择。
ABSTRACT I empirically analyze credit market outcomes when competing lenders are differentially informed about the expected return from making a loan. I study the residential mortgage market, where property developers often cooperate with vertically integrated mortgage lenders to offer financing to buyers of new homes. I show that these integrated lenders have superior information about the construction quality of individual homes and exploit this information to lend against higher quality collateral, decreasing foreclosures by up to 40%. To compensate for this adverse selection on collateral quality, nonintegrated lenders charge higher interest rates when competing against a better‐informed integrated lender.