Random Choice and Private Information
研究分析师如何从代理人的随机选择中识别其私人信息，并据此计算菜单事前估值、比较信息优劣、检验信念动态一致性和校准性。
We consider an agent who chooses an option after receiving some private information. This information, however, is unobserved by an analyst, so from the latter's perspective, choice is probabilistic or random. We provide a theory in which information can be fully identified from random choice. In addition, the analyst can perform the following inferences even when information is unobservable: (1) directly compute ex ante valuations of menus from random choice and vice versa, (2) assess which agent has better information by using choice dispersion as a measure of informativeness, (3) determine if the agent's beliefs about information are dynamically consistent, and (4) test to see if these beliefs are well-calibrated or rational.