MULTILATERAL TRADE BARGAINING AND DOMINANT STRATEGIES
基于关贸总协定的谈判行为，构建三国两商品一般均衡模型，研究非歧视和多边互惠约束下的多边关税谈判，识别各国使用占优策略提案时能达成的谈判结果。
Abstract Motivated by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade bargaining behavior and renegotiation rules, we construct a three‐country, two‐good general‐equilibrium model of trade and examine multilateral tariff bargaining under the constraints of nondiscrimination and multilateral reciprocity. For a general representation of government preferences, we identify the bargaining outcomes that can be achieved using dominant strategy proposals for all countries. In our analysis, dominant strategy outcomes emerge when tariff proposals are followed by multilateral rebalancing. The resulting bargaining outcome is efficient relative to government preferences if and only if the initial tariff vector positions the initial world price at its “politically optimal” level.