Institutions Matter: Comparing Deficit Spending in the United States and Japan
本文比较了二战后美国和日本的中央财政赤字，发现经济状况对两国赤字有重要影响，但政党、政府强弱等政治因素的解释力在美国和日本截然不同，这源于总统制与议会制的制度差异。
This article analyzes the post-World War II deficit experiences of the United States and Japan. Four potential explanations of the size of the central government deficit in these two countries are examined: the influence of the economy; the influence of the party in power; Roubini and Sachs's (1989a and 1989b) strength-of-government hypothesis; and the irresponsible Congress/responsible president hypothesis (relevant only to the United States). As expected, we find that in both countries the state of the economy has an important influence on the deficit. Controlling for the economy, we find stronger support for the strength-of-government hypothesis for Japan than Roubini and Sachs found. In the United States, however, we find no support for the party-in-power, the strength-of-government, or the irresponsible Congress/responsible president hypotheses. Indeed, these latter two hypotheses are contradicted by evidence that when the president has strong political and popular support, as measured by his control of Congress and the state of the economy, the U.S. deficit appears to increase by more than would otherwise be the case. The contrasting empirical results for the United States and Japan reflect the distinctive structural and institutional features of the U.S. presidential and Japanese parliamentary systems, the impact of these features on the incentives of the relevant political actors, and the influence of these incentives on the policy outcomes.