Backward Induction Foundations of the Shapley Value
基于Gul(1989)的模型，提出一个可通过逆向归纳求解的非合作博弈模型，发现“无正价值外部性”条件能确保子博弈完美纳什均衡支持夏普利值，而Gul的“价值可加性”条件不足。
We present a noncooperative game model of coalitional bargaining, closely based on that of Gul (1989) but solvable by backward induction. In this game, Gul's condition of “value additivity” does not suffice to ensure the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that supports the Shapley value, but a related condition—“no positive value-externalities”—does. Multiple equilibria can arise only in the event of ties, and with a mild restriction on tie-break rules these equilibria all support the Shapley value.