Does political pressure matter in bank lending? Evidence from China
利用2002-2011年中国省级数据，研究发现商业银行贷款增长与省级领导面临的政治压力正相关，尤其在国有银行中更显著，但银行部门发达地区此效应减弱。政治压力下的贷款商业性更差、质量更低。
Abstract Using provincial data from China between 2002 and 2011, we find substantial evidence indicating a positive association between the growth of bank loans issued by commercial banks and the political pressures faced by provincial leaders. This association is particularly true for state‐owned banks, which are much more politically pressurized than others, but is relatively attenuated in provinces with a more developed banking sector. We also find that bank loans issued under greater political pressures are less commercially oriented and have lower quality. Our findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity analyses and alternative measures of political pressure. Overall, our study contribute to a growing literature emphasizing the role of the political incentives of government officials in fuelling economic growth through credit allocation.