THE EFFECTS OF ASSET FORFEITURE ON POLICING: A PANEL APPROACH
利用新构建的面板数据，研究了美国1984年后允许警察机构保留没收资产的制度对警务强度和模式的影响，发现统计上存在微弱效应，但经济意义上不显著。
Asset forfeiture has proven highly controversial in the United States since its expansion in 1984. Most contentious is the widespread policy that allows police agencies to keep the assets seized, which both proponents and critics assert changes police behavior. From newly developed panel data sets, we find some statistical support for the proposition that police agencies change the intensity and pattern of policing in response to forfeiture. However, in economic terms these effects are very weak and do not support the proposition that forfeiture provides vital funds and incentives for crime policing.