立法投票中的同伴效应

Peer Effects in Legislative Voting

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2019
被引 40
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

利用欧洲议会的座位安排规则,研究发现相邻座位使同一政党议员投票分歧减少7%,且同伴效应在女性、同国议员及关键投票中更强,并具有持续性。

Abstract

We exploit seating rules in the European Parliament to identify peer effects in legislative voting. Sitting adjacently leads to a 7 percent reduction in the overall likelihood that two members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the same party differ in their vote. Peer effects are markedly stronger among pairs of women, MEP pairs from the same country, and in close votes. Using variation in seating across the parliament's two venues (Brussels and Strasbourg), we show that peer effects are persistent: MEPs who have sat together in the past disagree less even when they are not seated adjacently.

立法投票同伴效应欧洲议会议员投票行为