Learning about Mutual Fund Managers
研究投资者如何从基金经理管理的两只基金业绩中学习，发现资金流入受另一只基金业绩预测，但投资者在经理表现不佳时撤资不足，存在不完全学习现象。
ABSTRACT We study capital allocations to managers with two mutual funds, and show that investors learn about managers from their performance records. Flows into a fund are predicted by the manager's performance in his other fund, especially when he outperforms and when signals from the other fund are more useful. In equilibrium, capital should be allocated such that there is no cross‐fund predictability. However, we find positive predictability, particularly among underperforming funds. Our results are consistent with incomplete learning: while investors move capital in the right direction, they do not withdraw enough capital when the manager underperforms in his other fund.