It is a Sweetheart of a Deal: Political Connections and Corporate‐Federal Contracting
研究了政治献金是否影响政府合同条款选择，发现献金多的企业更易获得有利条款，且该效应独立于游说、谈判权力和前政府雇员雇佣。
Abstract We examine whether political connections measured by political contributions influence the choice of terms included in government contracts awarded to firms. We construct an index of four “sweetheart” contract terms and find that firms making larger political contributions more frequently have these favorable terms included in their contracts. We also find that political contributions have explanatory power for contract design after controlling for lobbying, negotiation power, and the employment of former government employees. These results are robust to alternative model specifications, different estimation techniques, various variable measurements, and adjustments for possible endogeneity.