Competitive Information Disclosure in Search Markets
研究卖家如何通过披露策略（如产品试用、评论和推荐）管理买家的搜索动机，并分析竞争如何影响信息提供。发现当卖家能观察买家信念或协调策略时，会提供垄断水平的信息；而当买家信念私有时，搜索成本趋近于零时卖家会提供完全信息。
Buyers often search across sellers to learn which product best fits their needs. We study how sellers manage these search incentives through their disclosure strategies (e.g., product trials, reviews, and recommendations) and ask how competition affects information provision. If sellers can observe the beliefs of buyers or can coordinate their strategies, then there is an equilibrium in which sellers provide the "monopoly level" of information. In contrast, if buyers' beliefs are private, then there is an equilibrium in which sellers provide full information as search costs vanish. Anonymity and coordination thus play important roles in understanding how advice markets work.