Financing Rhenish capitalism: ‘bank power’ and the business of crisis management in the 1960s and 1970s
本文通过五个金融危机管理案例，探讨德国大银行在莱茵资本主义体系中对企业的影响力和控制限度，发现银行仅在紧急情况下才能获得控制权，且往往代价高昂。
The German tradition of Hausbanks financing industrial enterprises over long periods, often accompanied by equity participation and memberships on supervisory boards, is considered a core element of Rhenish capitalism. Reconsidering the discussion about ‘bank power’ that has often referred to this system of corporate finance, this article explores the opportunities and limits of influence encountered by German big banks vis-à-vis their customers from big industry. Five case studies focusing on the management of financial crises are presented to demonstrate that, in practice, banks could only obtain control in cases of emergency, sometimes even against their will and at high cost.