Optimal contracts for research agents
研究了企业在不同研发部门设置下与研究员工之间的委托代理问题，描述了多代理人动态合同中最优激励方案的模式，发现当员工努力相互替代时采用相对绩效评估，互补时采用联合绩效评估，为研发企业的薪酬政策提供了理论依据。
We study the agency problem between a firm and its research employees under several scenarios characterized by different Research and Development (R&D) unit setups. In a multiagent dynamic contracting setting, we describe the precise pattern of the optimal contract. We illustrate that the optimal incentive regime is a function of how agents' efforts interact with one another: relative performance evaluation is used when their efforts are substitutes, whereas joint performance evaluation is used when their efforts are complements. The optimal contract pattern provides a theoretical justification for the compensation policies used by firms that rely on R&D.