Real Earnings Management and Information Asymmetry in the Equity Market
研究了西班牙上市公司通过真实活动操纵盈余的行为与股票市场信息不对称之间的关系，发现那些达到上年盈余水平的公司中，真实盈余管理会加剧信息不对称。
The literature suggests that real earnings management (REM) activities can increase adverse selection risk in capital markets. Due to their opacity and the difficulties in understanding their implications, REM strategies may increase the level of information asymmetry among investors. This paper examines the association between earnings management through real activities manipulation and information asymmetry in the equity market. To estimate the level of adverse selection risk we use a comprehensive index of information asymmetry measures proposed by the market microstructure literature. For a sample of Spanish listed firms, we find that firms’ strategies of increasing earnings through REM are associated with higher information asymmetry in those firms that meet last year’s earnings. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that earnings management through real activities manipulation garbles the market, enhances private information production, and exacerbates information asymmetry in the stock market.