The International Debt Crisis and Bank Management of LDC Loans
研究发现股票市场奖励银行主动管理发展中国家贷款风险，惩罚被动接受监管行动；1989年阿根廷债务减记和银行自愿增加贷款损失准备金的案例验证了市场反应。
Evidence found in this study suggests that the stock market banks for taking voluntary remedial action in the management of LDC exposure and punishes banks if involuntary regulatory action is required. A regulatory ordered write-down of Argentinean debt exposure in June, 1989 results in negative abnormal returns for a group of banks with high LDC exposure. A wave of voluntary additions to loan-loss reserves to reduce LDC exposure later in 1989 is studied. While the market does not anticipate a follow the leader effect until the second bank announces additions to loan-loss reserves, market responds as if the information is a surprise and good news. The market further rewards banks for making individual additions to loan loss reserves to cover LDC exposure.