Voluntary Disclosure and Informed Trading*
研究了知情交易如何影响企业自愿披露，发现披露成本和经理知情价值两个因素会改变其作用方向，对理解信息披露决策和公司价值有参考意义。
ABSTRACT This study analyzes the impact of informed trading on voluntary corporate disclosure in the presence of two factors: the cost of disclosure and the value of a manager's informedness. In the absence of both factors, informed trading has no impact on disclosure even when traders are not certain whether the manager has information. When disclosure is costly, informed trading serves as a free substitute for the disclosure of favorable information, and reduces disclosure . Surprisingly, when the manager's informedness is valuable for the firm, informed trading can also increase disclosure . Traders can discover unfavorable information about the firm, so managers with such information have less incentive to pool with uninformed managers and disclose to show that they are informed. The study also demonstrates that informed trading can have either a positive or a negative effect on firm value by crowding in or crowding out information production in the firm. These results hold for general information structures and are robust if traders can choose how much information can be acquired.