Managing Capital via Internal Capital Market Transactions: The Case of Life Insurers
研究了保险集团内部资本流动如何影响寿险公司的破产风险管理和监管政策，发现业绩下降时集团会向寿险公司注入资本，业绩上升时则支付内部股息，且金融危机期间股息对业绩更敏感。
Abstract The movement of capital within insurance groups is important for understanding insolvency risk management, as well as regulatory policies regarding capital standards and group supervision. Panel data estimates indicate that, on average, a dollar decrease in performance (net income plus unrealized capital gains) when performance is negative is associated with a $0.26 increase in capital contributions to life insurers from other entities in the group, and that a dollar increase in performance when performance is positive is associated with a $0.56 increase in the amount of internal shareholder dividends paid by life insurers to other entities in the group. Moreover, the sensitivity of internal dividends to performance is higher during the financial crisis than the noncrisis period. Also, insurers with low (high) risk‐based capital ratios receive more (less) internal capital contributions than other insurers, holding other factors constant.