Climate Policy with Tied Hands: Optimal Resource Taxation Under Implementation Lags
研究发现，当政策实施存在滞后时，宣布的庇古税会导致化石燃料价格过低，从而增加排放并抑制绿色创新。此时，最优的资源税路径可能需要调整，甚至可能在实施时补贴资源开采。
In the presence of implementation lags, announced Pigouvian taxation leads to fossil fuel prices that are too low from society's perspective. This results in excessive emissions and reduced incentives for green innovation. Such effects are compounded by the presence of pre-existing subsidies to fossil fuel use. We show that the intertemporal resource tax path may need to be modified to optimally take into account the perverse incentives from policy lags and pre-existing policies. We find that it might be optimal to subsidize, rather than tax resource extraction at the instant of implementation.