Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size
研究了Palfrey和Rosenthal提出的两个不对称规模群体（多数和少数）之间的关键选民参与博弈，发现唯一均衡是少数群体以确定性投票而多数群体以概率投票，并分析了其他均衡的存在条件。
We study the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes (majority and minority), as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983). We find a unique equilibrium wherein the minority votes with certainty and the majority votes with probability in (0, 1); we prove that this is the only equilibrium in which voters of only one group play a pure strategy, and we provide sufficient conditions for its existence. Equilibria where voters of both groups vote with probability in (0, 1) are analyzed numerically.