Perfect information games where each player acts only once
研究了由无限序列玩家组成的完美信息博弈，每个玩家在游戏中只行动一次。引入了一类基于频率的少数者博弈，并证明对于足够小的ε，这些博弈不存在子博弈完美ε-均衡，同时给出了保证存在性的一些充分条件。
Abstract We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mi>ϵ</mml:mi></mml:math> -equilibrium for any $$\epsilon $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mi>ϵ</mml:mi></mml:math> sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mi>ϵ</mml:mi></mml:math> -equilibrium.