Shifting the Goalposts? Analysing Changes to Performance Peer Groups Used to Determine the Remuneration of FTSE 100 CEOs
研究了FTSE 100公司CEO薪酬设定中绩效同行群体的年度变化，发现公司存在同行选择偏差，即排除表现更强的同行以保持群体较弱，而机构投资者持股较高的公司这种偏差较小。
This paper examines year‐on‐year changes to the composition of performance peer groups used for relative performance evaluation in setting CEO pay in FTSE 100 companies and finds evidence of peer selection bias. The authors find that firms keep their peer groups weak by excluding relatively stronger performing peers. They also show that peer selection bias is less pronounced in firms with higher institutional investor ownership, which suggests that institutional investors might be aware of the risks of peer selection bias. The results suggest that peer group modifications can be viewed, at least in part, as an expression of managerial rent‐seeking.