Harmonizing Internationally to Harmonize Internally: Accounting for a Global Exit from the EU's Decision Trap
本文通过会计标准案例，提出全球退出机制可破解欧盟联合决策陷阱，展示欧盟委员会如何利用全球协调推动内部协调，并在主权争议中维护一体化成果。
Abstract The joint decision trap concept traditionally explains progress in EU policy‐making through dynamics located within the EU's multi‐level governance. Yet, with the expansion of global regulatory co‐ordination, the EU governance system increasingly interacts with policy‐making in international regimes, which influences the internal dynamics of the EU's decision‐making. This article seeks to refine the joint decision trap model by introducing global exit mechanisms and illustrating their empirical relevance for the case of accounting standards. The global exit builds on leveraging the outside benefits of global policy, the legitimacy of global standards, and new opportunities for locking in policy preferences through global commitments. Specifically, the accounting case demonstrates the Commission's strategy of ‘harmonizing globally to harmonize internally’ that produced an agreement after decades of stalemate. Moreover, it demonstrates how the global exit enables the Commission to protect internal harmonization despite the growing criticism and calls for the repatriation of regulatory sovereignty.