Lender Steering in Residential Mortgage Markets
研究了贷款人如何通过引导借款人使用叠加贷款结构来规避首付比例超过80%时需购买抵押贷款保险的监管规定，发现叠加贷款违约率更低、提前还款更快，且该现象主要由贷款人供给端驱动。
Abstract In this article, we examine the incentives for lenders to steer borrowers into piggyback loan structures to circumvent regulations requiring primary mortgage insurance (PMI) for loans with loan‐to‐value ratios (LTV) above 80%. Our empirical analysis focuses on propensity score‐matched portfolios of piggyback and single‐lien loans having the same combined LTV based on a full set of observed risk characteristics. Our results confirm that mortgages originated with the piggyback structure have much lower ex post default rates and faster prepayment speeds than corresponding PMI loans. We also find a significant causal effect of interstate banking deregulation on the growth of piggybacks in these years, confirming that the ex post performance gap is primarily driven by lender steering on the supply side and not by borrower self‐selection. We then perform a number of tests to explore different origination and execution channels of mortgage steering.