Ration Gaming and the Bullwhip Effect
利用一家供应商和73家门店的交易数据，建立动态离散选择模型，证实了配给博弈（战略性囤货）会加剧牛鞭效应，且消除配给激励可使牛鞭效应降低12%。
We model the workings of a single-supplier, 73-store supply chain as a dynamic discrete choice problem, adopting a generalized (S, s) inventory framework. We estimate the model with transaction-level data, spanning 3,251 products and 1,370 days. We find two phenomena: ration gaming (strategic inventory hoarding) and the bullwhip effect (the amplification of demand variability along the supply chain). To establish ration gaming, we show that upstream scarcity can trigger an inventory run, as the stores scramble to secure supply. And to establish the bullwhip effect, we show that shipments from suppliers are more variable than sales to customers. We confirm the long-standing hypothesis that ration gaming causes the bullwhip effect with a structural econometric model, estimating that the bullwhip effect would be 12% smaller in the counterfactual scenario without ration gaming incentives. To our knowledge, we develop the first empirical multi-echelon inventory model.