The Strategic Behavior of Firms with Debt
实证研究了负债企业在竞争与非竞争环境中的战略行为，发现监管促使企业增加杠杆，而高杠杆的小企业和大企业在放松监管后采取不同策略：小企业提价保利润，大企业降价抢市场。
We empirically study the strategic behavior of levered firms in competitive and noncompetitive environments. We find that regulation induces firms to increase leverage, and this reduces their ability to compete when deregulation occurs. Large and small levered firms adopt different strategies upon deregulation. Whereas more levered small firms charge higher prices to increase margins at the expense of market shares, highly levered large firms prey on their rivals by increasing output and reducing prices to increase their market shares. The difference in their behavior is due to differences in their probability of bankruptcy and their financing constraints.