Housing Supply Elasticity and Rent Extraction by State and Local Governments
研究发现住房供给缺乏弹性会增强地方政府抽取租金的能力，导致税收增加，并促使公民通过立法限制官员权力；公共部门工人通过合法集体谈判或非法腐败获取部分租金。
Governments may extract rent from private citizens by inflating taxes and spending on projects benefiting special interests. Using a spatial equilibrium model, I show that less elastic housing supplies increase governments’ abilities to extract rents. Inelastic housing supply, driven by exogenous variation in local topography, raises local governments’ tax revenues and causes citizens to combat rent seeking by enacting laws limiting the power of elected officials. I find that public sector workers, one of the largest government special interests, capture a share of these rents through increased compensation when collective bargaining is legal or through corruption when collective bargaining is outlawed.