Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs
研究博弈论预测对玩家信念假设的敏感程度，通过刻画模型原始条件（信念和高阶信念）来评估稳健性，并应用于高阶信念扰动、共同先验一致性等问题。
Previous research has established that the predictions of game theory are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players’ beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by characterizing conditions on the primitives of the model—the players’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs about the payoff-relevant parameters—for the behaviour of a given Harsanyi type to be approximated by the behaviour of (a sequence of) perturbed types. This amounts to providing belief-based characterizations of the strategic topologies of Dekel et al. (2006). We apply our characterizations to a variety of questions concerning robustness to perturbations of higher-order beliefs, including genericity of types that are consistent with a common prior, and we investigate the connections between our notions of robustness and the notion of common $p$-belief of Monderer and Samet (1989).