The Political Economy of Weak Treaties
研究民主国家政治领导人为争取连任而谈判的条约为何往往设计得较弱，即可能被遵守也可能不被遵守，并解释为何条约过度依赖技术而非制裁来促进合规。
In recent decades, democratic countries have negotiated hundreds of international treaties and agreements. This paper analyzes the equilibrium design of treaties negotiated by political incumbents seeking reelections. We show that incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are "weak" in that they may or may not be complied with: this makes it possible to differentiate the alternative candidates in a way that favors the incumbent. We also show that political economy considerations lead to overambitious treaties that rely too much on technology instead of sanctions to motivate compliance. Our theory can rationalize several puzzles associated with treaties.