Standard Setting Organisations and Standard Essential Patents: Voting and Markets
研究标准制定组织如何通过投票与市场竞争选择高效技术标准，发现投票权与市场势力存在抵消效应，且含标准必要专利的激进创新能带来更高社会福利。
The analysis provides conditions under which standard setting organisations (SSOs) choose efficient technology standards. I introduce a two-stage game with both voting and market competition. In equilibrium, standards and market outcomes are efficient even with market power from scarce capacity and standard essential patents (SEPs). I show that a drastic innovation with SEPs generates greater social welfare than a less efficient standard without SEPs. A key finding is that voting power and market power have counterbalancing effects. The discussion helps explain empirical observation of differences in SSO voting rules, intellectual property (IP) rules, membership and alliances.