The structure of state borrowing: towards a political theory of control mechanisms
基于Amsden的控制机制理论，提出政治理论解释发展银行如何通过借贷谈判协调政治格局与融资控制，对研究国家金融治理的学者有参考价值。
Alice Amsden’s seminal work on the developmental state was premised on a general theory of control mechanisms. Her focus on development banking prioritises financial control. However, the development literature concentrates on one element of financial control: investments rather than borrowing. Further, a state bank makes borrowing bargains that are fundamentally political. Building on recent work on “political settlements” and development, we propose a political theory of control mechanisms that builds politics into Amsden’s theory of control. We then apply it to development bank fundraising, arguing that when development banking works, it does so by reconciling political settlements with control over fundraising.