Monitoring for Worker Quality
研究非管理岗位中，当工人日常产出相似但偶发问题代价高昂时，企业如何分配工作和监控工人质量，解释了绩效薪酬使用少、资历工资、晋升工资跳升等内部劳动力市场规律。
Much nonmanagerial work is routine, with all workers having similar output most of the time. However, failure to address occasional challenges can be very costly, and consequently easily detected, while challenges handled well pass unnoticed. We analyze job-assignment and worker-monitoring for such `guardian' jobs. If monitoring costs are positive but small, monitoring is nonmonotonic in the firm's belief about the probability that a worker is good. The model explains several empirical regularities regarding nonmanagerial internal labor markets: low use of performance pay, seniority pay, rare demotions, wage ceilings within grade and wage jumps at promotion.