Entry Deterrence in the Neo-Kaleckian Model-Optimizing Microfoundations-
研究了垄断竞争下新卡莱茨基模型的微观基础，考虑进入威慑效应，发现即使凯恩斯稳定性条件不满足模型仍稳定，且长期政策取决于增长体制和市场结构。
The central motivation of this paper is to consider the microfoundations of the neo-Kaleckian model with monopolistic competition, by explicitly considering the effect of entry deterrence. Using this model, the neo-Kaleckian model is stable even though the Keynesian stability condition is not satisfied. In the long run, we find various economic policies which depend on not only their growth regimes but also their market structures. When there is cooperative marketing agreement between competitors, an increase in the income distribution in favor of workers may lead to an increase in the growth rate even though the model is based on a profit-led growth regime.