Fiscal Centralization: Theory and Evidence from the Great Depression
研究大萧条如何导致美国州政府相对地方政府财政集权，通过模型和跨州数据表明收入下降引发财产税拖欠，推动转向销售税和财政集权。
The Great Depression produced a profound and lasting influence on the structure of US government. This paper studies theoretically and empirically the increased centralization of revenues and expenditures by the states relative to local governments during this period. A model of property and sales taxation and tax delinquency is introduced. In the model, the income decline of the Depression causes a rise in property tax delinquency and leads to a shift toward sales taxation and fiscal centralization by the states. Empirical evidence based on cross-state variation in the severity of the Depression is consistent with the model's key predictions.