Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie
研究个体在随机抽数后报告数字时的说谎行为，发现多数人选择最大谎言，但部分人只说小谎；当实验者无法验证结果时，更多人说小谎，且最高结果出现概率越低，小谎越多。
This paper studies lying. An agent randomly picks a number from a known distribution. She can then report any number and receive a monetary payoff based only on her report. The paper presents a model of lying costs that generates hypotheses regarding behavior. In an experiment, we find that the highest fraction of lies is from reporting the maximal outcome, but some participants do not make the maximal lie. More participants lie partially when the experimenter cannot observe their outcomes than when the experimenter can verify the observed outcome. Partial lying increases when the prior probability of the highest outcome decreases.