Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies
利用核心理论研究了大型拟线性经济中的信息传递，提出了基于均衡阻塞的核心概念，并分析了不同机制复杂度下的收敛性结果。
We study information transmission in large interim quasilinear economies using the theory of the core. We concentrate on the core with respect to equilibrium blocking, a core notion in which information is transmitted endogenously within coalitions, because blocking can be understood as an equilibrium of a communication mechanism used by players in coalitions. We focus on independent replicas of the basic economy. We offer both negative and positive convergence results as a function of the complexity of the mechanisms used by coalitions. Furthermore, all of the results are robust to the relaxation of the incentive constraints. Results for ex post and signal-based replica processes are also obtained.