An Experimental Examination of the Walrasian tatonnement Mechanism
通过实验比较计算机化多单位试探机制的不同版本（有无动态改进规则、有无订单流信息公开）与连续双向拍卖的效率，发现试探机制效率较低，仅完全信息无改进规则版本接近双向拍卖。
This is a systematic experimental comparison of the efficiency and competitive properties of a computerized multiunit tatonnement with or without a dynamic improvement rule, with or without publicity of order flow information. All versions of the tatonnement are comparatively less efficient than the continuous double auction. The tatonnement yields competitive prices, but both sides tend to underreveal demand/supply, causing inefficiency. Only the full-information, no-improvement-rule version of the tatonnement procedure approaches the efficiency of the double auction.