Impact of Shareholder Proposals on the Functioning of the Market for Corporate Control
研究发现收到股东提案的公司被收购的可能性增加16%，但收购回报降低约7.2%，表明股东提案有助于竞标者识别目标或传递股东接受低溢价的信号。
Abstract Firms receiving shareholder proposals are 16% more likely to become a target of acquisition. Such companies earn approximately 7.2% lower acquisition returns compared to gains for targets with no proposals. Higher acquisition likelihood and lower target returns are primarily associated with proposals drawing a larger proportion of favorable votes, larger voter turnout, as well as with proposals submitted shortly before takeover announcements, and motivated by the removal of antitakeover provisions. Our findings suggest that shareholder proposals can assist bidders in the identification of targets or signal the willingness of target shareholders to accept bids with lower premiums.