Corporate Control around the World
研究了2004至2012年间127个国家数千家上市公司的控制权结构，发现大陆法系国家中政府和家族控制普遍，而普通法系国家中控制权集团较少；控制权与股东保护、雇佣合同严格性和工会力量强相关，与债权人权利、法律形式主义和准入监管弱相关。
ABSTRACT We study corporate control tracing controlling shareholders for thousands of listed firms from 127 countries over 2004 to 2012. Government and family control is pervasive in civil‐law countries. Blocks are commonplace, but less so in common‐law countries. These patterns apply to large, medium, and small firms. In contrast, the development‐control nexus is heterogeneous; strong for large but absent for small firms. Control correlates strongly with shareholder protection, the stringency of employment contracts and unions power. Conversely, the correlations with creditor rights, legal formalism, and entry regulation appear weak. These patterns support both legal origin and political theories of financial development.