Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements
提出一项反垄断规则：专利和解必须让消费者至少不差于继续诉讼的结果，并用该规则评估合并、专利池和协商进入日期三种和解类型。
Patents, patent litigation, and patent settlements increasingly influence competition. Settlements of patent disputes comes in many forms, including licensing and cross-licensing agreements, patent pools, mergers, and joint ventures. While frequently pro-competitive, such settlements can stifle competition and harm consumers. This paper proposes a specific antitrust rule limiting such settlements: a settlement must leave consumers at least as well off as they would have been from ongoing patent litigation. After establishing that profitable settlements satisfying this constraint generally exist, the paper shows how this antitrust rule can be used to evaluate three types of settlements: mergers, patent pools, and negotiated entry dates.