Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy With Unobservable Goals
研究中央银行目标不可观测时，透明度如何影响其声誉、可信度及政策选择，发现提高透明度能使政策更接近社会最优，但可能损害银行自身利益。
We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and inferred from the policy outcome. Increased transparency makes the bank's reputation and credibility more sensitive to its actions. This moderates the bank's policy and induces the bank to follow a policy closer to the socially optimal one. Full transparency of the central bank's intentions is generally socially beneficial but frequently worse for the bank. Somewhat paradoxically, direct observability of idiosyncratic central bank goals removes the moderating influence on the bank and leads to the worst equilibrium.