Exploring the Double‐Sided Effect of Information Asymmetry and Uncertainty in Mergers and Acquisitions
研究了并购中买方和卖方信息不对称及不确定性对支付方式选择的影响，发现高不确定性目标更可能用股票支付，而高信息不对称则增加现金支付概率，买方借此获取更多收益。
Abstract We examine the joint effect of bidder and target information asymmetry and uncertainty on the payment consideration and subsequent wealth effects in a large sample of acquisitions with both listed and private targets. In line with a risk‐sharing argument, we find that acquisitions of targets characterized by higher uncertainty are more likely to be settled with stock. In contrast, higher target information asymmetry increases the likelihood of a cash payment, consistent with bidders strategically exploiting superior information. Acquirers of more opaque targets obtain a larger fraction of total acquisition gains and avoid sharing these gains with target shareholders by offering cash.