Corruption and State and Local Government Debt Expansion
研究发现，美国各州公共腐败程度越高，州和地方债务总量越大；若十个最腐败州的腐败降至平均水平，其公共债务可降低9%，人均约249.35美元。
Abstract Theories describing rent seeking in the public sector posit a number of negative fiscal outcomes that the choices of corrupt officials may generate. The evidence presented in this article shows that states with greater intensities of public corruption have higher aggregate levels of state and local debt. If corruption in the 10 most corrupt states were only at an average level, their public debt would be 9 percent lower, or about $249.35 per capita, all else being equal. Notably, institutional control measures may not have succeeded in restraining the expansion of state and local public debt in the presence of greater levels of corruption. State and local governments would achieve more efficient levels of fiscal discipline by curbing public sector corruption .