The need for status as a hidden motive of knowledge-sharing behavior: An application of costly signaling theory
基于代价信号理论，研究揭示员工分享隐性知识和专长是为了获得地位认可，且受主管评价和岗位设计因素影响，对管理者激励知识共享有参考价值。
This study draws on costly signaling theory (CST) and explores the hidden motive of proactive knowledge sharing. We theorize that the need for status drives employees to generously share their tacit knowledge and special expertise to obtain social recognition and status as conferred by supervisory appraisal. We tested our hypotheses based on the moderated mediation model using a sample of 146 supervisor–subordinate dyads that were collected from South Korean organizations. The present analysis supports the proposed theoretical framework based on CST, thereby providing new insights into the need for status as an unexplored hidden motive of proactive knowledge sharing and the roles of job design factors as contextual contingencies. This study offers theoretical and practical implications related to knowledge management, employee motivation, and job design.