Bank‐Owned Life Insurance and Bank Risk
研究发现银行拥有的人寿保险（BOLI）自2001年以来增长超过两倍，且BOLI的增加导致流动性风险、信用风险和利率风险上升，表明监管机构的担忧是合理的。
Abstract The use of bank‐owned life insurance (BOLI) has more than tripled since 2001 and has caught the attention of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. I find increases in BOLI lead to higher levels of liquidity risk, credit risk, and interest rate risk. Robustness tests confirm these results and suggest over‐ and underinvestment in BOLI and use of BOLI as a tax shelter contribute to risk increases. Results indicate that the concerns expressed by regulators are warranted, and suggest insurance may not always have the intended effect of reducing firm risk because of unintended consequences or misuse.