Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices
研究了当竞拍者根据私人信息在两个并行的共同价值拍卖市场中选择时，信息如何聚集；发现一个市场的摩擦会通过竞拍者的选择模式破坏另一个无摩擦市场的信息聚集。
We study information aggregation when n bidders choose, based on their private information, between two concurrent common‐value auctions. There are k s identical objects on sale through a uniform‐price auction in market s and there are an additional k r objects on auction in market r , which is identical to market s except for a positive reserve price. The reserve price in market r implies that information is not aggregated in this market. Moreover, if the object‐to‐bidder ratio in market s exceeds a certain cutoff, then information is not aggregated in market s either. Conversely, if the object‐to‐bidder ratio is less than this cutoff, then information is aggregated in market s as the market grows arbitrarily large. Our results demonstrate how frictions in one market can disrupt information aggregation in a linked, frictionless market because of the pattern of market selection by imperfectly informed bidders.