Dividend Manipulation at Unlisted REITs
研究了非上市REITs在持续股权发行期间通过支付高股利来吸引新股权，并在发行后削减股利的操纵行为，对关注REITs股利政策的投资者和学者有参考价值。
Abstract Dividend policy at unlisted firms is confounded by the continuous equity offering—as exists for unlisted REITs. Unlisted firms lack visible share prices, which heightens the sensitivity of investors to dividends paid during the offering. By paying high dividends early, managers of unlisted REITs positively influence the flow of new equity. Dividend manipulation occurs when discretionary yields are exceptionally high and predominantly favorable dividend changes occur during the equity offering, followed by a surge in unfavorable changes after the offering. Evidence of dividend manipulation at unlisted REITs is provided where even discretionary yields are significantly reduced once the offering expires.