Information Aggregation with Costly Reporting
一群有私人信息的个体共同选择二元选项，每个个体需决定是否付费报告信号。研究发现，大群体无法承诺决策规则时，只能在一个状态下高概率正确，另一状态下正确概率有界；但通过转移支付或非匿名规则可接近最优。
Abstract A group of privately informed individuals with common interests chooses a binary option. Each individual chooses whether to reveal her signal, at a cost. If the group is large and cannot commit to a decision rule then it takes the correct decision with high probability in one state but with probability bounded away from one in the other. It cannot do better by committing to an anonymous decision rule without transfers, but can achieve the first best if transfers between individuals are possible, and can approximately achieve the first best with a non-anonymous decision rule.