QUALITY CHOICE AND MARKET STRUCTURE: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF NURSING HOME OLIGOPOLIES
构建了一个动态进出模型，分析养老院行业的质量选择与寡头市场结构，发现相似质量的企业竞争更激烈，且降低低质量养老院的政策会导致供给短缺。
This article develops a dynamic model of entry and exit to analyze quality choice and oligopoly market structure in the nursing home industry. I find significant heterogeneity in the competitive effects across market structures: Firms of similar quality levels compete more strongly than dissimilar firms. Sunken entry costs are extremely large, and quality adjustment behavior is governed by significant fixed adjustment costs. A proposal to eliminate low‐quality nursing homes is found to cause a large supply‐side shortage, and another proposal to lower entry costs has offered a perverse incentive to provide low quality of care.